Objectivity and ethics in environmental health science. by Wing, Steve
In politics, policy, and law, science has
emerged as an alternative to folk traditions,
religion, and superstition as a way to under-
stand and manipulate the material world. The
value and prestige of the sciences derive not
only from their erudition, explanatory power,
and applied technology but from their per-
ceived objectivity. A common view among sci-
entists and lay persons alike is that scientiﬁc
objectivity is a consequence of standardized
methods of quantitative observation and
experimentation. The scientific method, by
removing subjectivity and social influence,
yields knowledge that is ostensibly trustworthy
and objective.
Despite the persistence of this view,
historians, philosophers, and scientists them-
selves have shown that it does not provide an
adequate account of the production of scien-
tific knowledge (Harding 1991; Holtzman
1981; Hubbard 1990; Kuhn 1970). There are
several reasons why method cannot remove
social influences from science. First, the
content and methods of science are formed in
relation to answering questions or testing
hypotheses that are socially embedded.
Second, scientific explanation requires lan-
guage, concepts, and models that are cultural
products. Although all sciences expend consid-
erable effort to rationalize concepts and termi-
nology, these tools of inquiry are inevitably
shaped and transformed by historical forces.
Therefore, scientists cannot even see the world,
much less provide explanations of its workings,
without a socially formed perspective.
Ironically, the belief that science could attain
objectivity through independence from social
forces places science in the role of a religion’s
omniscient God (Harding 1991). The illogic
of the naïve view of scientiﬁc objectivity has
been described in physics, genetics, and epi-
demiology, as well as in mathematics and sta-
tistics (Armstrong 1999; Hubbard 1990;
Keller 1992, 1995; Kuhn 1970; Levins 1979;
Levins and Lewontin 1985).
The reluctance of scientists to acknowledge
the shaping of their work by social forces and
their ongoing avowal of science as value-free
can be viewed as a self-serving argument against
public oversight (Keller 1995). However, even
among scientists who accept an ethic of social
responsibility, attempts to salvage naïve objec-
tivity persist because the alternative is perceived
to be a judgmental relativism in which there is
no basis for adjudicating competing claims.
Such relativism is anathema to the most basic
assumptions of science: that a real world exists
independent of human cognition, and that the-
ories and hypotheses about that world can be
tested by controlled methods of observation
and experimentation. A logical alternative to
both judgmental relativism and naïve objectiv-
ity is “strong objectivity,” an objectivity
attained through revealing, rather than conceal-
ing, the cultural content and social forces that
are embedded in science (Harding 1991). To
practice strong objectivity, scientists must con-
sider not only the technical aspects of their dis-
cipline, but must also take into account its
history, conceptual foundations, preconcep-
tions, taboos, and the social forces that shape its
content and application. This requires scientists
to distinguish truth, in the form of statements
about the world made by people, from reality,
the world itself (Hubbard 1990; Rorty 1989),
and to be self-critical about the ways scientists
create truths and facts in relation to the real
world that they study.
This article explores how a contextual
research practice can improve the rigor, ethics,
and social responsibility of environmental
health science. I use as a case example research
on cancer incidence after the 1979 nuclear acci-
dent at Three Mile Island (TMI) near
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA. I consider how
unarticulated cultural views about the reliability
of assumptions and evidence shaped the fram-
ing of questions, the design of research, and the
interpretation of ﬁndings in the scientiﬁc litera-
ture as well as in the courtroom. 
Accident at Three Mile Island
Three Mile Island is in the Susquehanna River
about 16 km (10 miles) from Harrisburg, the
capital of Pennsylvania, where the Susquehanna
cuts across parallel ranges of hills that rise hun-
dreds of meters above the river. Several smaller
towns are located along the river near to TMI
(Figure 1). Dairy and other farms are common
in the area, which has a strong agricultural
tradition (Figure 2). 
At 4:00 A.M. on 28 March 1979, a series
of events began that led to a loss of control of
the nuclear chain reaction in the TMI Unit 2
reactor. For several days it was not clear how
or when the reactor could be shut down.
Uncontrolled releases of radioactivity to the
environment began shortly after 4:00 A.M.o n
28 March. Within hours, radiation monitors
at the plant went off-scale because radiation
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During the past several decades, philosophers of science and scientists themselves have become
increasingly aware of the complex ways in which scientiﬁc knowledge is shaped by its social con-
text. This awareness has called into question traditional notions of objectivity. Working scientists
need an understanding of their own practice that avoids the naïve myth that science can become
objective by avoiding social inﬂuences as well as the reductionist view that its content is determined
simply by economic interests. A nuanced perspective on this process can improve research ethics
and increase the capacity of science to contribute to equitable public policy, especially in areas such
as environmental and occupational health, which have direct implications for proﬁts, regulation,
legal responsibility, and social justice. I discuss research into health effects of the 1979 accident at
Three Mile Island near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania, USA, as an example of how scientiﬁc explana-
tions are shaped by social concepts, norms, and preconceptions. I describe how a scientiﬁc practice
that developed under the influence of medical and nuclear physics interacted with observations
made by exposed community members to affect research questions, the interpretation of evidence,
inferences about biological mechanisms in disease causation, and the use of evidence in litigation.
By considering the history and philosophy of their disciplines, practicing researchers can increase
the rigor, objectivity, and social responsibility of environmental health science. Key words: cancer,
chance, dose reconstruction, environmental justice, epidemiology, ionizing radiation, research
ethics, significance testing, Three Mile Island. Environ Health Perspect 111:1809–1818 (2003).
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capacity (Macleod 1981). Although thermo-
luminescent dosimeters were placed off-site
on 30 March, there were large angular gaps
between the monitors (Beyea 1985). As a
result, there was little information about
early releases and poor capacity to detect nar-
row plumes with low dispersion. At the time
the region was experiencing unusually balmy
temperatures and low winds as an upper-level
cold air mass kept lower-level warm air from
rising—ideal conditions for trapping radioac-
tive emissions (Steinacker and Vergeiner
2002). Xenon-133 from TMI was detected
in Albany, New York (Wahlen et al. 1980).
The possibility that a hydrogen explosion
in the reactor containment or a meltdown of
the reactor core would result in high-level
radiation exposures generated great fear and
anxiety among officials and the public
(Del Tredici 1980; Gray and Rosen 1982).
Lack of knowledge about details of the plant’s
condition, lack of experience with this type of
situation, and nonfunctional radiation moni-
tors gave rise to conﬂicting reports about the
severity of the accident and its threat to the
public. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(NRC) reported a reading of 3,000 millirads
per hour taken above the plant on 29 March
(NRC 1979b). About 5–6% of people within
5 miles of the plant left during the ﬁrst 2 days
of the accident. After Governor Thornburgh’s
30 March order to evacuate pregnant women
and children from the 5-mile area, nearly 50%
of residents left (Houts and Goldhaber 1981). 
On 1 April, the hydrogen gas bubble began
to dissipate, and concerns of imminent danger
diminished. Industry and government repre-
sentatives assured the public that only small
quantities of radiation had been released and
that exposures were far below levels that could
affect health. The NRC and a presidential
commission released reports indicating that the
maximum possible off-site radiation dose was
less than average annual background levels
(NRC 1979a; President’s Commission on the
Accident at Three Mile Island 1979). 
The official position that high-level
radiation exposures were impossible was ques-
tioned by hundreds of local residents who
reported metallic taste, erythema, nausea,
vomiting, diarrhea, hair loss, deaths of pets
and farm and wild animals, and damage to
plants (Del Tredici 1980; Molholt 1985;
Osborn 1996; Three Mile Island Alert 1999).
Many of these phenomena could be caused by
radiation; however, the maximum possible
dose was officially reported to be orders of
magnitude less than the dose needed to pro-
duce acute symptoms. Residents were told
that their symptoms were due to stress.
People who pressed their concerns about radi-
ation were treated as though they had
psychologic problems.
Epidemiology of the Accident
Health studies at TMI began to be planned
soon after the immediate danger had ended.
In June 1979, the Pennsylvania Department
of Health, working with the Centers for
Disease Control and the U.S. Census Bureau,
conducted a special census of residents living
within 5 miles of TMI (Goldhaber et al.
1983c). The University of Pittsburgh’s
Department of Radiation Health provided
estimates of radiation doses for 5-mile area
residents “for educational, public relations
and defensive epidemiology purposes” (Gur
et al. 1983). The demographics of evacuation
(Goldhaber et al. 1983a), medical care use,
and spontaneous abortion (Goldhaber et al.
1983b) were studied. Many studies of stress
have been published, making the 1979 acci-
dent at TMI one of the best-studied cases of
psychologic response to disaster and evacua-
tion (Baum 1990; Baum et al. 1983, 1993;
Cleary and Houts 1984; Cornely and Bromet
1986; Davidson et al. 1987; Dew and Bromet
1993; Dew et al. 1987a, 1987b; Fabrikant
1983; Gatchel et al. 1985; Houts et al. 1991;
Houts and Goldhaber 1981; McKinnon et al.
1989; Prince-Embury and Rooney 1988;
Schaeffer and Baum 1984).
Few studies took on the topic of radiation
exposures. Ionizing radiation is considered to
be one of the best-understood carcinogens,
and scientists asserted that doses at TMI had
been too low to produce any observable
effects on cancer. Population dose estimates
and quantitative cancer risk estimates based
on studies of the survivors of the atomic
bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki yielded
a prediction of, at most, one accident-related
cancer death in the lifetimes of the population
in the 50-mile area (Hatch et al. 1990).
Therefore, there was no scientific reason to
study health effects of radiation. 
Yet, concerns persisted that some areas near
TMI had been exposed to high radiation levels
during the accident. In 1984 Carl Johnson,
former Director of Health in Jefferson County,
Colorado, site of the Rocky Flats nuclear
weapons plant, spoke at a public meeting at
the Pennsylvania State University–Harrisburg
campus in Middletown, Pennsylvania. He
described reports of symptoms consistent with
high-level radiation exposure that had been
experienced during the accident in several hill-
top neighborhoods near TMI (Johnson C.
Unpublished data). Johnson’s description
piqued the interest of Marjorie Aamodt, an
experimental psychologist by training, who,
with her husband, Norman Aamodt, an engi-
neer, had been participating in hearings regard-
ing the restart of TMI Unit 1. 
In the spring of 1984, Marjorie Aamodt
initiated a household survey in three hilltop
communities with a total population of about
450 people. All three neighborhoods had
unobstructed views of TMI at distances of
between 3 and 8 miles (Aamodt and Aamodt
1984). Two of the communities were areas
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Figure 1. View of TMI from the roof of an apartment building in Middletown,
Pennsylvania, 19 July 1979. Photograph copyright of Robert Del Tredici (Del
Tredici 1980) and used with permission.
Figure 2. Farm in Londonderry Township near TMI, 4 July 1979. Photograph
copyright Robert Del Tredici (Del Tredici 1980) and used with permission.that Dr. Johnson had identified. Using a
structured questionnaire designed with input
from Dr. Johnson, Ms. Aamodt and several
volunteers interviewed residents about symp-
toms and diseases experienced during and after
the accident. They obtained descriptions of
metallic taste, nausea, vomiting, hair loss, and
erythema, almost all from people who had
been out-of-doors, as well as information on
the occurrences of cancers, cardiovascular dis-
eases, reproductive problems, dermatologic
conditions, and ruptured/collapsed organs.
Residents reported 19 cancer deaths during
1980–1984, compared with an expected num-
ber of 2.6. In June 1984, the Aamodts submit-
ted a report to the NRC proceeding on the
competency of the utility to conduct surveil-
lance of radiation releases (Aamodt and
Aamodt 1984). 
The Aamodt survey soon came to the
attention of the TMI Public Health Fund. The
Fund, financed by the nuclear industry and
administered by the Federal District Court in
Harrisburg, had been created in 1981 as part
of a settlement for economic losses from the
accident. Scientiﬁc advisors to the Fund veri-
fied several aspects of the Aamodt study,
including the ascertainment of cancer deaths
and calculation of expected deaths, and recom-
mended a more comprehensive study of cancer
in the TMI area. The Fund chose a team led
by Mervin Susser, a highly renowned epidemi-
ologist from Columbia University, New York,
New York, to design and conduct the cancer
study. The Columbia investigators proposed
an innovative design that avoided several com-
mon problems that can lead to ambiguous
results in environmental epidemiology (Hatch
et al. 1990). 
Because concerns about cancer among
both patients and physicians could have
resulted in earlier detection of cancer and
cause higher incidence rates as an artifact of
publicity, the Columbia group did not com-
pare TMI area residents to an unexposed con-
trol group from another area. Rather, they
divided the 10-mile area into small study
blocks, each of which was assigned an accident
dose based on a state-of-the-art dispersion
model that considered release estimates, mete-
orologic, and topographic data (Beyea and
Hatch 1999). Dose estimates for the 69 study
blocks varied by more than three orders of
magnitude. This permitted a comparison of
cancer rates along a continuum from low to
high exposure areas, all of which had a similar
potential for early detection of cancer.
Although the accident occurred in 1979, inci-
dent cancer cases were identiﬁed for the period
1975–1985, making it possible to evaluate the
variation in cancer rates that existed in the area
both before and after the accident. This design
feature was important because cancer rates
show signiﬁcant geographic variability, and it
would have been a mistake to attribute high
cancer rates in a more exposed area to accident
emissions if rates there were already higher
prior to the accident. Population counts
according to age and gender for each year
from 1975 to 1985 were derived from census
data. The Columbia design permitted an eval-
uation of the relationship between estimated
accident dose and cancer incidence for the
population within 10 miles of TMI, with
adjustment (control) for preaccident variation
in cancer incidence. Estimation of dose–
response relationships with adjustment for dif-
ferences in risk between the exposure groups
prior to exposure is rarely possible in environ-
mental epidemiology.
Two publications by Columbia investiga-
tors describe cancer incidence in relation to
the TMI accident (Hatch et al. 1990, 1991).
Hatch et al. (1990) reported positive associa-
tions between accident doses and non-
Hodgkin’s lymphoma, lung cancer, and all
cancers combined. Leukemia, analyzed sepa-
rately for children and adults, was also posi-
tively associated with accident dose. However,
these estimates lacked statistical precision
because of small numbers (54 cases at all ages
combined). The authors reasoned that results
did not “provide convincing evidence” that
TMI radiation releases had inﬂuenced cancer
in the area. Among the considerations weigh-
ing against a causal interpretation were 
the lack of effects on the cancers believed to be most
radiosensitive and the indeterminate effects on chil-
dren . . . the low estimates of radiation exposure
and the brief interval since exposure occurred. 
They continued, 
Pending a demonstration that very low dose
gamma radiation can act as a tumor promoter or
the identiﬁcation of another late-stage carcinogen
in the efﬂuent stream, an effect of plant emissions
in producing the unusual patterns of lung cancer
and non-Hodgkin’s lymphoma appears unlikely,
and alternative explanations need to be considered. 
One alternative explanation was considered
in a second report (Hatch et al. 1991). Using
distance from TMI as the measure of psycho-
logic stress, Hatch et al. considered the hypoth-
esis that increased cancer rates after the
accident were caused by stress. Findings were
equivocal because of the speculative nature of
the mechanism of cancer promotion by stress-
induced neuroendocrine dysfunction as well as
lack of a speciﬁc measure of stress. 
Reanalysis of the Cancer
Incidence Study
By the time the Columbia studies were
published, a lawsuit alleging health damages
from radiation released in the TMI accident
had been under way for several years.
Approximately 2,000 plaintiffs argued that
emissions of radioactive gases during the
accident were much larger than had been
stated by industry and government officials;
meteorologic conditions and hilly terrain had
caused the radioactive gases to disperse in nar-
row plumes; and these intense plumes had
exposed small areas of the surrounding coun-
tryside to high radiation doses, resulting in
health impacts including cancer (Merwin et al.
2001). Marjorie and Norman Aamodt were
consulting for plaintiffs’ attorneys and asked
to meet with me to discuss the litigation. They
provided documents including their health
survey, sworn afﬁdavits from TMI neighbors,
analyses of local mortality records, scientific
articles, government reports, and letters and
memoranda from scientists and government
ofﬁcials suggesting that radiation releases and
doses from the accident had been substantial.
They asked me to provide epidemiologic
support for the plaintiffs in the suit.
I was wary of becoming involved in the
lawsuit. Although I had not thoroughly stud-
ied the TMI accident, I knew that allegations
of high radiation doses at TMI were consid-
ered by mainstream radiation scientists to be a
product of radiation phobia or efforts to extort
money from a blameless industry. Years of col-
laboration with epidemiologists and health
physicists aligned with the U.S. Department
of Energy (DOE) Health and Mortality Study
had familiarized me with a culture in which
concerned workers and community members,
as well as scientists who claimed there was evi-
dence of health effects of low-level radiation,
were viewed as threats to the nuclear industry
(Morgan 1992). Taking the plaintiffs’ allega-
tions seriously enough to become involved in
any professional capacity might expose me to
ostracism and loss of scientiﬁc credibility. 
However, I was impressed with the
intelligence and humanity of the Aamodts
and with their thoughtful compilation of evi-
dence. As in all research of this type, impor-
tant measurements of interest had not been
made, case reports, statistical observations,
and related records were not entirely consis-
tent, and mechanisms for some putative
effects were uncertain. Nevertheless, their sce-
nario of higher-than-reported doses did not
seem implausible. My reaction to the
Aamodts’ work was not only a function of
evidence suggestive of high releases; it was
also a function of a willingness to consider the
possibility that official conclusions might be
in need of revision. 
My personal experience, as well as study
of the history and current practices of radia-
tion epidemiology, had led me to adopt a
skeptical attitude toward ofﬁcial assumptions
and logic. On a small scale, our collaborative
team engaged in the DOE Health and
Mortality Studies had been assured repeatedly
by industry and federal officials that no
records existed that could account for a gap
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records. However, shortly after publication of
our report that the existing workers’ badge
readings were related to their cancer mortality
(Wing et al. 1991), over 14,000 radiation
records that we had been seeking for more
than 2 years were provided to us (Wing et al.
1994). On a larger scale, major radioactive
releases from nuclear weapons sites had been
concealed from the public for decades
(Thomas 2001); government-funded scien-
tists had conducted human radiation experi-
mentation without informed consent
(Advisory Committee on Human Radiation
Experiments 1995; McCally et al. 1994); risks
to workers and the public had been withheld
because of concerns about litigation and loss
of public support for the nuclear industry
(Advisory Committee on Human Radiation
Experiments 1995; Makhijani et al. 1995;
Office of Technology Assessment 1991;
Sterling 1980); and epidemiologists who devi-
ated from status quo views about radiation
and health had lost funding and suffered pro-
fessionally (Greenberg 1991; Lyon 1999;
Morgan 1992; Stewart and Kneale 1991;
Thomas 2001; Wilkinson 1999). At the scale
of the scientiﬁc culture itself, there had long
been a lack of nuanced scientiﬁc logic in the
deference given by radiation epidemiologists
to quantitative estimates of radiation risks
based on the world’s most studied radiation-
exposed population, the Japanese A-bomb
survivors (Stewart 2000; Wing et al. 1999). 
Given these facts, it seemed possible that
the full story about radiation releases, doses,
and health effects from the TMI accident had
yet to emerge. Although I had never previ-
ously participated in litigation, I was aware
that some of my colleagues had provided tes-
timony for the defendants in radiation cases.
Knowing that the defendants in the TMI case
had many experienced experts at their dis-
posal and that it was difﬁcult for plaintiffs to
ﬁnd help, I agreed to examine epidemiologic
data related to the case.
One of the first tasks I undertook was a
review of published studies on “mass hysteria,”
a medical term for outbreaks of psychogenic
illness with no physical etiology (Brodsky
1988; Donnell et al. 1989; Faust and Brilliant
1981; Hefez 1985; Simon et al. 1990; Small
and Borus 1987). There is no doubt that the
TMI accident had created high stress, even
panic nor is there any doubt that stress can
produce physical symptoms. Although some
symptoms reported by TMI area residents—
nausea and vomiting, for instance—are com-
monly reported in the literature on outbreaks
of psychogenic symptoms, other symptoms,
most notably metallic taste and hair loss, are
not. Furthermore, one hallmark of mass
psychogenic illness is that it occurs in public
places where people witness the symptoms of
others. At TMI most symptoms were reported
by people who had not been in public, some
of whom said they had not even heard about
the accident at the time of their symptoms.
Thus, although it seemed plausible that some
psychosomatic illness would have occurred at
TMI, most reports did not ﬁt the classic sce-
nario of mass psychogenic illness. Nonhuman
occurrences were obviously not psychogenic,
although reports could have resulted from
increased vigilance or altered perception due
to the accident. I did not attempt to validate
independently cases of unusual mortalities or
abnormalities in animals and plants, and lack
of ongoing systematic surveillance precluded
comparisons with baseline (preaccident) rates;
however, the detail and quality of observation
left me unable to dismiss these reports.
The Aamodts were interested in further
examination of cancer incidence data assem-
bled by Columbia. The Columbia investigators
had not acknowledged the possibility that
community members’ symptoms might have
been a sign of signiﬁcant amounts of radiation.
They assumed from the beginning that acci-
dent doses were below average background lev-
els, and they did not analyze data for the
hilltop communities in the 1984 health survey.
The plaintiffs’ legal team asked me to reanalyze
the Columbia cancer incidence data to check
whether study block boundaries had been con-
structed in a way that might have obscured
clusters and to evaluate whether excess cancers
may have occurred in areas where there had
been reports of acute symptoms and other
unusual phenomena. 
Although skepticism about the Columbia
study was understandable, the study was, in
principle, well designed, and I knew that the
investigators were highly respected. However,
recognizing that there were several potentially
interesting omissions from the published
results, I agreed to conduct reanalyses if the
data could be released through the court. The
court decided not to disclose the locations of
residence of cancer cases on the grounds that
this would violate patient confidentiality;
however, the court did direct that we be
given, for each study block, a) dose estimates,
b) numbers of cases of speciﬁc types of cancer,
c) population counts, and d) average levels of
education, income, and population density.
Estimates of doses from gamma radiation for
each study block were given in relative units
that ranged from 0 to 1,666. The values were
not assigned a unit of measurement (e.g., Sv
or rem) but were calculated on a ratio scale
such that a value of 10 was twice that of 5,
and a value of 1,000 was twice that of 500
(Hatch et al. 1990). 
We considered different primary hypotheses
and used a primary analytical method different
from the one used by the original investigators
(Wing et al. 1997c). Because ionizing radiation
is a mutagen related to most if not all malig-
nancies, and because higher doses of radiation
can lead to immune suppression and promo-
tion of initiated cancers, we considered all can-
cer as one primary outcome. We examined
lung cancer because beta-emitting radioactive
gases in the accident plumes could have pro-
duced higher doses to the lung than to other
organs. We considered leukemia, including
chronic lymphocytic leukemia (which had
been omitted in the Columbia reports) because
studies of high-dose radiation have shown that
leukemia is more radiation sensitive and
appears sooner after exposures than solid
tumors. Although leukemia was a primary out-
come of the Columbia study, incidence among
children and adults had been analyzed sepa-
rately, reducing an already small sample size.
More important, the childhood cancer analyses
considered children conceived after the acci-
dent as exposed, potentially diluting any differ-
ences in cancer incidence between exposed and
unexposed children. Finally, we used baseline
(preaccident) cancer rates rather than socioeco-
nomic status variables (education, income, and
population density) as the primary method to
control for potentially confounding differences
in other cancer risk factors between more- and
less-exposed populations within the 10-mile
area (Wing et al. 1997c).
Our analyses corrected for two problems
that had affected the Columbia results. One of
their published analyses included duplicate
case counts that we were able to eliminate
from the reanalysis. In addition, the original
preaccident period was deﬁned as 1975–1979.
However, case ascertainment for 1975 was
incomplete. This led to an underestimation of
cancer incidence in the preaccident period and
an overestimate of the increase in cancer fol-
lowing the accident. To correct this problem,
we redefined the preaccident period as
1976–1979 (Wing et al. 1997b, 1997c). 
We found positive relationships between
accident dose estimates and cancer rates for all
three categories of cancer. The slope of the
dose–response estimates was largest for
leukemia, intermediate for lung cancer, and
smallest for all cancers. Estimates were larger
for cancers that occurred in 1984–1985
(a 5-year lag) than for cancers that occurred in
1981–1985 (a 2-year lag), and they were larger
when statistical adjustments were made for
differences in socioeconomic status between
areas of low and high dose. Lung cancer
showed the most consistent dose–response
relationship across levels of dose. Figure 3
shows dose estimates in relation to lung cancer
rates, based on the 440 cases diagnosed in the
10-mile area during 1981–1985, adjusted for
preaccident variation in lung cancer incidence,
but not for socioeconomic status. The height
of the bars represents the difference between
the observed numbers of cases at each dose
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occurred if each area had experienced the aver-
age lung cancer rates of the 10-mile area
population as a whole.
Epidemiologic Evidence 
in Court
Scientiﬁc rigor and objectivity have a special
value in courts of law, which specify rules for
deciding what constitutes scientific evidence
and whether scientiﬁc evidence is reliable and
therefore admissible at trial. Since 1993, the
standards for admissibility of scientific evi-
dence in federal courts have been based on
the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993).
Judges decide whether expert testimony can
be considered in litigation based on criteria
expounded in Daubert, other cases, and in
the Federal Rules of Evidence:
1) there is a testable hypothesis
2) the methodology has been subjected to
peer review
3) the results have an acceptable “known or
potential rate of error”
4) standards are used to control the reliabil-
ity of the methodology
5) there is adequate support and acceptance of
the methodology by a scientiﬁc community
6) the testimony relies on facts or data used
by other experts in the discipline
7) the expert’s professional qualiﬁcations are
adequate
8) the methods have the potential to be used
for purposes outside the courtroom
(Merwin et al. 2001)
Exclusion of evidence that does not meet
these standards is intended to protect juries
from being exposed to untrustworthy scientiﬁc
testimony.
Our reanalysis of the TMI cancer
incidence data was submitted to the District
Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
in support of the plaintiff’s allegations. My
testimony about relationships between esti-
mated doses and cancer incidence in the
10-mile area was being used as evidence that
signiﬁcant exposure had occurred, not as evi-
dence that a particular plaintiff’s cancer was
caused by radiation. The defendants argued
that our study was unreliable and that the
judge should exclude it from trial on grounds
that it did not satisfy the Daubert criteria. 
The court considered the admissibility of
our reanalysis based on our report describing
the study’s hypotheses, design, materials, ana-
lytical methods, results, and conclusions;
transcripts of depositions conducted by
defense attorneys; the defendants’ motions
in limine (to suppress); plaintiffs’ responses to
defendants; reports on our study prepared by
defendants’ experts; my afﬁdavits responding
to questions from the judge; and testimony
by the defense experts and me at an in limine
hearing. The court’s evaluations of each of
the criteria are summarized in Table 1.
Defendants did not challenge the first
Daubert criterion, and the judge found that
“the cancer incidence study methodology
consists of a testable hypothesis” (TMI
Litigation Cases Consolidated II 1996a).
Under the second criterion the court
considered whether the methodology used to
produce the results had been peer reviewed.
The Columbia team’s papers, and therefore
the basic study design and data collection, had
been peer reviewed and was recognized by the
court. Part of our study was a replication of
the original analyses showing that we could
apply the same statistical methods to produce
the same results. In other analyses we applied
the same statistical method to corrected data
using different controlling (or adjustment) fac-
tors corresponding to the before–after design
of the study. Despite these facts, the judge,
noting that “Aside from Wing’s ‘unadorned
assertions’ that the methodologies have been
subject to peer review, Plaintiffs have pre-
sented no evidence of this fact,” ruled, “This
factor will weigh against the admission of the
proffered testimony” (TMI Litigation Cases
Consolidated II 1996a).
The court made two rulings on the issue of
the third criterion, the known or potential rate
of error (TMI Litigation Cases Consolidated II
1996a, 1996b). Because of a lack of under-
standing of how to interpret the standard
errors of the dose–response regression coefﬁ-
cients provided in our report, the court initially
deferred its decision on the “rate of error.”
However, the first ruling cited defendants’
argument that the findings could have been
“ascribable to chance as well as to any real asso-
ciation with accident emissions” on the basis of
95% conﬁdence limits around our estimates of
dose response for all cancer (in the models that
omitted socioeconomic status) and leukemia
(in models with and without socioeconomic
status) (Wing et al. 1997c), which, defendants
noted, included the null value of no effect
(TMI Litigation Cases Consolidated II
1996b). The court then cited defendants’
experts as claiming that lung cancer “has never
been identiﬁed with radiation exposure as an
isolated effect,” implying that lung cancer was
the only type of cancer that showed a dose
effect, and also cited their claim that there was
not sufﬁcient latency for lung cancer to appear
after the accident. In its second ruling on the
rate of error, the court accepted the defendants’
claims that minimum latency for lung cancer
was known to be 10 years (TMI Litigation
Cases Consolidated II 1996b). Below I discuss
this juxtaposition of argument about statistical
testing and the state of knowledge about cancer
latency and radiosensitivity. However, in its
second ruling, the court did not exclude evi-
dence from our study on rate of error grounds.
The court next considered whether there
were standards controlling the operation of
our technique. Although seemingly impressed
with our quality control procedures, which
led us to identify biases associated with
double-counting of cancer cases and an
undercount in 1975, the court found fault
with what the defendants cited as our failure
to conduct analyses of incidence of “the types
of cancers known to be radiogenic” and of
cancer deaths. Our failure to conduct these
analyses balanced against the quality control
procedures in the court’s evaluation of our
standards of control. The court ruled, “This
factor will not weigh against the admission of
the proffered testimony” (TMI Litigation
Cases Consolidated II 1996a).
Mini-Monograph | Objectivity and ethics in science
Environmental Health Perspectives • VOLUME 111 | NUMBER 14 | November 2003 1813
Table 1. Consideration of admissibility of evidence
from the reanalyses of cancer incidence in the TMI
10-mile area, District Court for the Middle District
of Pennsylvania. 
Weight in consideration 
Criterion for admission of admission
1. Testable  hypothesis For
2. Peer-reviewed  methodology Against
3.  Known or potential rate  Neither for
of error nor against
4.  Standards are used to  Neither for 
control reliability nor against
5. Support and acceptance of  Neither for 
methodology nor against
6.  Relies on facts or data used  Against
by other experts
7. Professional  qualiﬁcations For
8.  Potential for use outside 
the courtroom For
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Figure 3. Radiation emissions and incidence of lung
cancer, 1981–1985, in the TMI 10-mile area. Figure
adapted from Dalrymple (1997).On the fifth criterion, the court found
that the principle of reanalysis was generally
accepted, and it attributed to defendants
the claim that “the statistical technique
employed by Wing is generally accepted in
the scientific community” (TMI Litigation
Cases Consolidated II 1996a). The latter
point is ironic given the court’s decision that
lack of peer review of the methodology
weighed against admissibility. However, the
court agreed with defendants that the
methodology was problematic “because it
produces conclusions at odds with what is
generally known and accepted about cancer
latency periods” (TMI Litigation Cases
Consolidated II 1996a). This factor, like the
standards of control, did not weigh against
admission of the testimony.
Regarding our reliance on facts or data
used by other experts, the court found, “In
many ways Wing’s cancer incidence study
closely resembles a standard and reliable epi-
demiologic reanalysis. Yet in one important
way it does not. Wing’s reanalysis produces
no conclusive findings” (TMI Litigation
Cases Consolidated II 1996a). This lack of
conclusiveness, according to the court,
weighed against admission of our study. The
court found that criteria seven and eight, pro-
fessional qualifications and nonjudicial uses,
weighed in favor of admissibility.
Deferring only the final decision on rate
of error, which eventually was decided in
favor of admissibility, the court weighed all
the Daubert criteria to decide on admissibility
of the reanalysis (TMI Litigation Cases
Consolidated II 1996a). The ruling found
our results on all cancer and leukemia to be
admissible at trial. The lung cancer ﬁndings,
including the regression analysis summarizing
the dose response shown in Figure 3, were
excluded based on defendants’ arguments that
radiation-induced lung cancer has a minimum
latency of 10 years, and that the analyses were
therefore irrelevant to the case.
Discussion
The TMI cancer incidence studies were
conducted in the context of conﬂict between
residents who believed they had been injured
and officials who denied that such injuries
were possible, as well as conflicts between
scientists over the magnitude of radiation
releases, the state of knowledge about radia-
tion-induced cancer, and the meaning of evi-
dence produced by the TMI cancer incidence
studies. In the next section, I intend to show
how the objectivity, rigor, and ethics of
science can be increased by analyzing the
influence of these conflicts on research
assumptions, methods, and conclusions. I
begin with a discussion of the court’s reason-
ing on the admissibility of the reanalysis,
focusing on Daubert criteria 1–3 and 5.
Testable hypotheses: collision of evidence
and assumptions. The court found that our
methodology did involve a testable hypothesis.
Ironically, we argued that although the
Columbia investigators designed a study with
a testable hypothesis, they were unable to test
it because of their assumptions. A testable
hypothesis requires that evidence of the effect
be interpretable as supporting the hypothesis.
Support should be strengthened to the extent
that the design and conduct of the study help
rule out alternative explanations for the ﬁnd-
ings. However, the Columbia investigators
clearly stated that the accident doses were
known to be too low to produce the effects
being hypothesized; the increased risk of can-
cer at the assumed maximum dose to a mem-
ber of the public would have been less than
one-half of 1% according to standard assump-
tions, clearly an excess too small to be
detectable by epidemiologic methods (Wing et
al. 1997c). We argued that a follow-up study
of cancer mortality among adults in the TMI
5-mile area (Talbott et al. 2000, 2003) suf-
fered from the same logical ﬂaw: assumptions
of low doses clearly precluded an interpreta-
tion of the positive dose–response relation-
ships as supportive of the hypothesis under
investigation (Wing and Richardson 2001). 
If the testability of a hypothesis depends on
assumptions as well as methodology, then an
evaluation of the quality of a study must
address the logic of key assumptions as well as
the methodology. The assumption that the
cancer risk of the maximally exposed person
would increase by only 0.5% was supported by
official reports. We addressed a testable
hypothesis only because we considered the pos-
sibility that these reports could be wrong.
Without that possibility, there would be no
testable hypothesis. Our association with plain-
tiffs in the litigation introduced us to critical
reevaluations of radiation monitoring, detailed
case reports of symptoms (Aamodt and
Aamodt 1984; Molholt 1985), biodosimetric
studies of persons who reported symptoms at
the time of the accident (Shevchenko 1996;
Shevchenko and Snigiryova 1996), and meteo-
rologic and environmental analyses (Field et al.
1981; Steinacker and Vergeiner 2002; Wahlen
et al. 1980), as well as the court order that
directed calculation of radiation doses for the
Columbia study. The order prohibited “upper
limit or worst case estimates of releases of
radioactivity or population doses . . . [unless]
such estimates would lead to a mathematical
projection of less than 0.01 health effects,” and
further speciﬁed that “a technical analyst . . .
designated by counsel for the Pools [nuclear
industry insurers] concur on the nature and
scope of the [dosimetry] projects” (Three Mile
Island Litigation 1986). These court-imposed
restrictions, which conditioned the input of the
investigation (release estimates) on projections
of its outcome (health effects), constitute a
manipulation of research that was possible, in
part, because of years of investigative compla-
cency brought on by entrenched assumptions
that precluded even consideration of the pos-
sibility of high releases. The requirement of
prior concurrence by lawyers for the industry
suggests that the industry’s image and liability
were more important than accuracy and
full disclosure.
Peer review: normal science. Under
Daubert, the court considers peer review of
the methodology to be a factor in the admissi-
bility of evidence. The court’s decision that
lack of peer review weighed against admissi-
bility of our study was curious and internally
contradictory for reasons noted above. In
principle, peer review is one of several
Daubert criteria that gives preference to nor-
mative scientific views under the debatable
assumption that widely held beliefs are more
reliable. Although peer review may catch
obvious flaws or poor writing, it cannot
ensure that ﬁndings are correct, or even that
research is not fraudulent (Broad and Wade
1982). In areas where scientiﬁc research, pro-
fessional meetings, fellowships, and journals
are funded through organizations with inter-
ests in an established perspective, peer review
by orthodox scientists may lead to rejection of
studies whose results challenge established
assumptions, even if their methodology is
appropriate (Nussbaum 1998; Nussbaum and
Köhnlein 1994). 
Known or potential rate of error. This
criterion of admissibility is intended to recog-
nize that scientiﬁc studies make measurements
to quantify phenomena, and that the accuracy
of these measurements is an important crite-
rion. For example, upon repeated measure-
ments of identical samples, variability in a
scale, assay, or other measurement device pro-
duces a distribution of results similar to the
patterns of card combinations produced by
well-shufﬂed decks. In the case of epidemio-
logic studies of exposure–disease relationships,
the courts have taken statistical parameters
such as standard errors, conﬁdence limits, test
statistics, and p-values to be indicators of this
rate of error. 
Our report provided information on
sample size, goodness of fit, and standard
errors of regression coefficients rather than
p-values or 95% confidence intervals.
Although confidence limits and p-values can
be easily calculated from standard errors and
likelihood ratio tests, they are commonly mis-
interpreted as reﬂecting a process of random-
ization in which there is an a priori probability
distribution of results from repeated unbiased,
well-controlled experiments distributed
around the true parameter (Greenland 1990).
In the absence of randomization or random
sampling in the TMI cancer incidence study
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evidence should be evaluated 
in the context of the sensitivity of the ﬁndings to
changes in assumptions and data, coherence of the
evidence with other knowledge, the magnitude of
associations, their consistency across groups, and
temporal relationships of exposure and effect.
(Wing 1995)
Although the court recognized literature
recommending that the admissibility of evi-
dence should not be determined solely on the
basis of a significant p-value or a confidence
interval excluding the null value of no statistical
association, defendants speciﬁcally made that
argument, and the court was uncertain about
how to judge my less mathematical approach.
The problem, according the judge, was that,
“To the extent that the results are more likely
the product of random error than a true causal
relationship, the probative value of the study
necessarily diminishes” (TMI Litigation Cases
Consolidated II 1996a). I argued that random
error was not the issue because randomization
had not been employed.
The court’s interpretation reflects
confusion between the use of chance as a tool
and the idea of chance as a force of nature.
Chance as a tool is familiar in card games,
random sampling, and random allocation,
and can be created only by complete control
over the materials being manipulated: cards,
sampled units, or patients assigned to treat-
ment. Under these conditions, probabilities of
particular occurrences are deﬁned because the
materials can be ordered or mixed through a
process (shuffling, randomization) that has
been constructed to eliminate systematic
influence on the order or assignment.
Following the use of chance as a tool, long-
run probabilities are determined if there is no
bias in the conduct of the game or research. 
Statistical testing in observational settings,
including most epidemiology, occurs in
studies of aspects of the real world, such as
dose–response relationships, in which there
have been no randomization and no random
sampling. Under these conditions there is no a
priori probability distribution because chance
has not been used as a tool. Therefore, chance
introduced through randomization is not a
possible explanation of a result. What, then, do
researchers (or courts) mean when they
conclude from statistical tests that results are
likely due to chance? They should not mean
that some unknown factor is the cause, because
other causes that create (or mask) the appear-
ance of an association between exposures and
outcomes are referred to as confounders
(whether or not they have been measured).
Rather, the concept of chance in observational
research has been confused with its original
interpretation in randomized studies: it is
treated as a force of nature that functions as an
alternative explanation to speciﬁc causes. 
In its second ruling on the rate of error
issue, the court quoted from the affidavit I
prepared on this issue in which I attempted to
explain why the strict application of statistical
tests being advocated by defendants was
increasingly recognized as inappropriate:
Abuse of significance testing in epidemiological
research is now widely appreciated and discussed.
The problem is clearly recognized by one of the
defense’s experts, K. Rothman, who wrote in an
editorial introducing a paper on logical problems
with statistical signiﬁcance testing, “In a century in
which science has revealed that molecules and
atoms are mostly unoccupied space and that matter
is energy anyway, we should be accustomed to hav-
ing the substance of our scientiﬁc foundations dis-
solve into emptiness. In this issue [of the journal],
Greenland perforates the foundations of statistical
interpretations used by epidemiologists in just this
way” (Rothman 1990). The problems with signiﬁ-
cance testing noted in the paper by Greenland
(Greenland 1990) have been recognized for some
time, but have been ignored in the interests of pre-
serving a simple if fallacious method that was
believed to result in the separation of conclusive,
causal associations from those that are inconclusive
or spurious. That method is the determination of
the statistical signiﬁcance of a ﬁnding. As noted by
Rothman, “conventional statistics [p-values and
conﬁdence limits] have a strict interpretability in
experiments with random assignment of exposures.
The results of those experiments are nearly always
dressed in the same statistical garb that was devel-
oped for and is applied to experimental studies.
Greenland shows us that, despite our reliance on
conventional statistics for interpreting our non-
experimental results, there is no basis for the inter-
pretations usually given to these statistics in
nonexperimental settings.” [emphasis added]. This is
because, in the absence of randomization of expo-
sure in a fair experiment, it is not possible to distin-
guish the extent to which test statistics reﬂect bias
or the exposure under investigation. (TMI
Litigation Cases Consolidated II 1996b)
That a normative scientific practice used
to distinguish causal from noncausal relation-
ships—central not only to science but to its
social and legal applications—could “dissolve
into emptiness” should be disconcerting to
those who count on science for objective and
rational knowledge. Critical analysis of normal
scientific practice can help to identify such
emptiness before serious mistakes are made. In
the TMI reanalysis we chose a contextual set
of criteria to evaluate quantitative evidence
because we did not believe that results could
be a product of random error unless random-
ization had been introduced by design. If our
primary quest had been small p-values, we
would have used one-tailed tests (because our
hypothesis was one-directional), emphasized
results adjusted for socioeconomic status, and
analyzed log-transformed doses, which, as
noted by Mangano (Mangano 1997), would
have better ﬁt the data and produced smaller
p-values. 
Invocation of chance as a force of
nature—a cause incapable of being further
analyzed—can discourage scientists from
humility about the scientiﬁc enterprise as well
as deeper mechanistic analysis (Gigerenzer
et al. 1989). In the case of environmental
health research, this may discourage the test-
ing of hypotheses or use of methods with the
greatest potential to implicate institutions
that permit or produce pollution. An under-
standing of how chance as a tool has been
conﬂated with chance as an explanatory force
of nature could help to improve the practice
and applications of science. However, even
without a detailed understanding of that
process, it is clear that current practice,
although normative science, is inconsistent
and illogical. Chance may have created an
empire in the world of science (Hacking
1990), but its emperor has no clothes.
Basis of assumptions about radiogenic
cancers and cancer latency. The court’s ruling
that our lung cancer ﬁndings were inadmissi-
ble at trial was based on defendants’ claims
that a) only lung cancer was statistically sig-
nificantly related to accident dose estimates,
b) lung cancer has never been found as the
sole effect of radiation, and c) radiogenic lung
cancer is known to have a minimum latency
of 10 years. These arguments, repeated in the
court’s rulings under several Daubert criteria,
especially the ﬁfth, imply that dose–response
relationships for leukemia and all cancer
resulted from random error, and that the
results for lung cancer must be due to some
other error because they could not occur as a
result of the hypothesized cause. Although the
leukemia dose–response coefﬁcients, based on
75 cases, were less precise than the lung can-
cer estimates, they were roughly 40% larger in
magnitude, which would be consistent with
studies showing steeper relationships for
leukemia than for solid tumors after high-
dose radiation. Dose–response coefﬁcients for
all cancers were more precise but smaller in
magnitude, which would be consistent with
lower doses to organs other than the lung
(Wing et al. 1997a, 1997c).
Our interest in lung cancer was based on
the presence of radioactive gases, primarily
xenon-133 and krypton-85, in the accident
plumes. In addition to penetrating gamma
radiation, these gases emit beta radiation,
which has low penetration and therefore
would have delivered direct doses selectively
to exposed skin and respiratory tissues, which
would be consistent with reports of erythema
and putative impacts on plants as well as ele-
vations in lung cancer. However, even if lung
doses were substantial, no cancer effect would
be seen in the incidence study if radiogenic
lung cancer has a minimum latency of
10 years.
There have been no epidemiologic studies
of the exposure of human populations to
radioactive xenon and krypton gases.
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and timing of cancers that could result must
be based on inference from studies of other
types of ionizing radiation. Defendants
argued that the study of Japanese A-bomb
survivors, upon which official estimates of
radiation risks and latency have been based,
proved that lung cancer has a 10-year mini-
mum latency. In response, we noted that ion-
izing radiation can act as a promoter as well as
an initiator of cancer (Doll 1978); that high
doses can suppress immune function, which is
associated with the appearance of secondary
tumors within 2 years of radiotherapy
(Appelbaum 1993); and that latencies of less
than 5 years have been observed for miners
exposed to radon (Hornung and Meinhardt
1987). A recent study of lung cancer among
uranium miners found the best estimate of
minimum latency to be less than 1 year
(Langholz et al. 1999). 
Epidemiologists often remain skeptical of
estimates of dose–response relationships
because of questions about possible con-
founding and measurement error. In the area
of radiation health effects, however, the
A-bomb survivor studies are widely used for
risk estimation and have long functioned as a
“gold standard” for judging other epidemio-
logic evidence (BEIR V 1990). The A-bomb
studies have this status despite being based on
a select group of survivors that had to resist
radiation, blast, and the aftermath of war to
enter the study, and whose radiation doses
were not measured but calculated based on
a) estimates of radiation releases that have
been repeatedly revised, and b) interviews
whose accuracy depended on the survivors’
memories and their trust of researchers con-
nected with the U.S. military occupation
forces (Lindee 1994; Stewart 2000; Wing
et al. 1999). The status of the A-bomb studies
as a gold standard has shaped the normative
scientific culture, including peer review,
research funding, and dismissal of conﬂicting
evidence from other populations (Nussbaum
and Köhnlein 1994; Wing et al. 1999).
Critical analysis of the evolution of radiation
epidemiology within the context of the mili-
tary, medical, and industrial uses of ionizing
radiation can help scientists reevaluate the
A-bomb studies more objectively. Such an
approach would help to increase the explana-
tory capacity of radiation health science and
improve its applications in the courts, com-
pensation programs, and public education
(Wing and Richardson 2002).
Radiation versus stress as causal
explanations. From their inception, epidemio-
logic studies of the TMI accident focused on
stress. Although this was not specifically an
issue in the court, it is central to the epidemiol-
ogy and public relations of the accident.
Citizens were told that symptoms similar to
those which are caused by radiation exposure
were due to stress. Studies were designed to
quantify health effects of stress in general, and
specifically as an alternative explanation to
radiation-induced cancer increases following
the accident. An editorial commenting on the
paper by Hatch et al. (1991) on stress and can-
cer suggested that the stress–cancer link might
be used as grounds for not disclosing accidents
to the public because the resulting stress would
injure people (Janerich 1991). When radiation
exposures were studied, discussion of ﬁndings
focused on reasons why radiation effects may
have been overestimated or spurious, ignoring
plausible reasons why they may well have been
underestimated (Hatch et al. 1990; Talbott et
al. 2000; Wing and Richardson 2001). The
Columbia investigators chose not to discuss
dose misclassiﬁcation and migration, for exam-
ple, as reasons to expect underestimation of
radiation effects (Hatch et al. 1990). In fact,
they planned to consider the possibility of con-
founding bias in estimates of dose response
only in the event that they found a positive
radiation–cancer relationship (Susser 1997),
despite the fact that such bias could also mask
a true effect. The lack of attention to these
standard interpretive issues can be understood
in terms of the key role that assumptions play
in evaluating the meaning of results (Wing
et al. 1997b). 
Despite differences in results between the
Columbia studies and ours, both found evi-
dence of impacts of the accident on cancer
incidence. However, the evidence led us to
different conclusions regarding both cause
and biological mechanism. The Columbia
group concluded that the evidence suggested
stress as a cause, and stress-induced immune
system depression as a mechanism. We con-
cluded that the evidence suggested radiation
as a cause, and promotion of cancer through
late-stage “hits” in a multistage process of
carcinogenesis, as well as radiation-induced
immune system depression, as mechanisms.
Keller described an analogous situation in
which experimental observations on genetic
mutations were redescribed and reinterpreted
to produce different conclusions about causes
and mechanisms (Keller 1992). 
Conclusion: The Ethics of
Strong Objectivity
Conflicts over responsibility for damage to
health and the environment are increasingly
common. They often involve disputes
between actors, such as industries and govern-
ments, with the ability to make large impacts
as well as sponsor research on those impacts,
and communities that are most directly
affected but that have little political power or
capacity to conduct research to document
their exposures or health conditions (Wing
2002). Affected communities may experience
these situations as examples of environmental
injustice. Many rural people living near TMI
had modest levels of formal schooling and lit-
tle experience in being assertive with govern-
ment and industry ofﬁcials. Those that spoke
out about their experiences of physical prob-
lems from the accident endured ridicule. The
Aamodts were able to influence the TMI
Public Health Fund’s sponsored research on
physical impacts of the accident by initiating
their own survey, researching government
records, and petitioning the NRC. Other resi-
dents who lived within the 10-mile area also
conducted surveys, constructed disease maps,
and documented damage to plants and ani-
mals (Osborn 1996; Three Mile Island Alert
1999). However, when health studies were
undertaken through ofﬁcial channels, citizens
who believed they had been affected by acci-
dent emissions and their supporters were not
included in the framing of questions, study
design, analysis, interpretation, or communi-
cation of results. The studies themselves were
funded by the nuclear industry and con-
ducted under court-ordered constraints, and a
priori assumptions precluded interpretation
of observations as support for the hypothesis
under investigation. 
The naïve approach to objectivity,
represented in the Daubert criteria, contends
that scientists can produce unbiased evidence
by standing apart from legal conflicts and
adhering to normative science. The problem
with this position is that scientific questions
and the details of speciﬁc working hypotheses
emerge from conﬂicts, which also inﬂuence the
assumptions that frame methodologies used to
produce evidence and interpretations of the
meaning of evidence. This process occurs at
various scales, from decisions about how much
to trust conﬂicting assertions regarding a spe-
ciﬁc event like the TMI accident, to the role of
the A-bomb studies as a gold standard for eval-
uating evidence, to widespread conventions
such as the confusion between chance as a tool
and chance as a force of nature. Although sci-
ence has strong rationalist traditions, it has
also been shaped by perspectives of dominant
gender, race, and class groups, excluding per-
spectives of groups with less power (Harding
1991; Holtzman 1981; Hubbard 1990; Levins
1979; Levins and Lewontin 1985). Pretending
that there are no assumptions embedded in
scientiﬁc methodology conceals and reinforces
existing inequalities. 
Strong objectivity demands that scientists
critically evaluate how the knowledge they cre-
ate is shaped at every point by historical social
forces. Strong objectivity is therefore not a static
feature of scientific knowledge that, once
attained, becomes a property of that knowl-
edge. It is an evolving process that is never ﬁn-
ished, like scientific inquiry itself. Scientists
should be trained to engage in careful reﬂection
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affected their hypotheses, assumptions, and
tools, and how their work, like the work of oth-
ers before them, is shaped by contemporary
forces (Armstrong 1999). This is essential as
careful measurement and analysis for producing
an objective science that will be maximally rig-
orous, rational, reliable in courts of law, and
useful for improving the world. Strong objectiv-
ity is needed, not only for good science, but for
ethical conduct of research. 
Postscript
In December 1999, after summary dismissal
of the TMI case by the District Court for the
Middle District of Pennsylvania, the U.S.
Third Circuit Court of Appeals found that
the district court had erred in excluding our
lung cancer findings (although the appeals
court also ruled that the lung cancer ﬁndings
would not change the outcome of the case).
In December 2002, the circuit court declined
to hear an appeal of Judge Rambo’s second
ruling granting summary dismissal. Attorneys
representing 1,990 remaining plaintiffs in the
TMI case declared they would take no further
legal action (Associated Press 2002).
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